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The choice of Insider or Outsider top executives in 
acquired companies 
Introduction 
This paper presents the results of an empirical study into the type of top executive put in 
charge to manage an acquired company. Top executives have a critical role to play post-
acquisition as they are vital for re-establishing strategic leadership (1) and have a key 
influence upon Merger and Acquisition (“M&A”) performance (2). However many empirical 
studies show that there are significantly higher levels of change in top executives in an M&A 
situation than at other times (3). Indeed, in the UK, less than half of acquired CEOs remained 
in position two years post deal (4). With such significant levels of change in top executives in 
acquired companies, most being within the first two years (5) it is important to investigate 
whether the nature of top management leads to their retention or change. 
 
The decision to retain incumbent top executives, or remove and replace them with ones drawn 
from outside the acquired company, may be influenced by their nature or, more specifically, 
their prior organisational experiences. In other contexts it has been shown that the prior 
organisational background of a top executive is associated with the amount of subsequent 
change which occurs in their company. When top executives are drawn from outside the 
organisation there follows significantly higher levels of subsequent organisational change 
than when incumbents remain in-post (6). 
 
In a post-acquisition context numerous commentators have observed widely varying levels of 
subsequent organisational change. These are sufficiently varied in volume and nature to lead 
researchers to conclude that there are quite different approaches to integrating acquired 
companies (7). This has spawned a number of post-acquisition integration typologies (8) 
which identify distinctive ways in which acquired firms may be integrated. However none of 
these frameworks examines the nature of top executives in these situations. None asks 
whether different types of top executive might be used to manage alternative post-acquisition 
integration strategies and whether they are linked with specific types of organisational 
change. It is these questions which this paper addresses: which type of top executive, by prior 
organisational background, is used to manage an acquired company in order to pursue 
different post-acquisition integration strategies? How does top executive type affect the 
changes which occur in different integration strategies? 
 
The paper begins by reviewing the literature on top executive change in acquired companies. 
It then links top executive type with overall organisational change. The dimensions of 
alternative post-acquisition typologies and a post-acquisition integration framework are then 
examined as a prelude to generating two first order hypotheses linking them with top 
executive type. Four post acquisition organisational integration styles are then discussed and 
second order hypotheses generated associating top executive type with post-acquisition 
integration style. The novel dual methodology, of quantitative survey and qualitative 
interviews, is outlined and results presented. Discussion follows about the use of Insider or 
Outsider top executives and the changes they make in different post-acquisition integration 
situations. 
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Top executive change in M&A 
In response to why so many M&A fail, research attention has focused upon top executives in 
charge of acquired companies as they are intimately involved in implementation of post 
acquisition strategy. There is some debate over whether it is better to retain top executives or 
to replace them as some studies show that retained incumbents result in more successful 
integration outcomes (9) whilst others, such as Karaevli‟s (2007) substantial review of 5 
decades of empirical research into  the consequences of CEO change, show much more mixed 
results (10). Cases for and against retaining acquired top executives and for replacing them 
can be made. The loss of longer tenured executives can have the most detrimental effects on 
acquired firm performance as they have the greatest firm-specific knowledge which is not 
easily replaced (11) and provide leadership continuity which helps reduce employee 
uncertainty and negative reactions (12). However retaining long tenured top executives may 
also be an obstacle to change as they become more rigid in their actions and remain 
committed to prior policies. If the incumbent is the founder of the acquired business they 
might also run the business in a stewardship rather than agency way which may not mean the 
maximization of profits for new shareholders (13). Replacing incumbent top executives may 
allow a greater focus upon profitability as well as more novel strategies which diverge from 
those of predecessors. New top executives may be more open minded and more likely to 
make changes to the acquired firm. They may transfer acquirer systems and culture 
effectively to the target to increase interdependence with the parent company which may 
achieve short term performance objectives (14). However top executives drawn from outside 
the acquired business will lack critical firm level skills which may make fitting into the 
culture of the organization problemmatic (15).  
 
The problem for all of these studies is that they seek to generalise the use of top executive 
type across all acquistions when there is significant evidence that acquistions are highly 
varied in nature, not least in terms of post acquistion integration. They also attempt to link top 
executive to acquisition outcome with little consideration for the actual changes which occur 
post acquisition. In other words to attempt to prescribe one type of top executive for all post 
acquisition strategies is to miss a crucial point, that post-acquisition integration is highly 
varied in nature and likely to require sensitive use of different types of top executive. It may 
be that ignoring what changes actually happen in the post acquisition phase is why so many 
studies seeking to link top executive type to post acquisition outcome are confounded.  
Top executives and organisational change 
Although there is little direct empirical research examining the link between top executive 
retention and actual, rather than inferred, post-acquisition organisational change, related areas 
of research are of some assistance. For instance, the turnaround literature is replete with 
examples of executive succession leading to significant organisational change (16). Even in 
contexts where there is no performance decline, top executive succession increases the 
likelihood of organisational transformation (17), and is often a necessary precondition for 
significant organisational change (18). Where the CEO is replaced, organisations are 
significantly more likely to undergo revolutionary transformation (19). 
 
Linking top executive change with organisational change resonates with the Insider (a top 
executive drawn from within the focal firm) / Outsider (a top executive drawn from outside 
the focal firm) distinction. Findings from this literature are consistent: Outsiders tend to make 
more organisational changes than Insiders (20).  
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Explanations for differences in the volume of change include new top executives having 
fewer vested interests than incumbents (21), and they enter an atmosphere of expectancy 
about change in the organisation (22). From the appointers‟ perspective there may be a 
selection bias which favours Outsiders where change is required and Insiders where the status 
quo is preferred (23).   
 
In summary there appears to be considerable empirical support for the view that systematic 
differences between Insiders and Outsiders may exist in terms of the volume of subsequent 
organisational change. In a post-acquisition context, with various integration styles 
demanding different levels of organisational change, a differential use of Insiders and 
Outsiders would, therefore, be expected. This paper therefore addresses the following 
questions; 1) is the nature of the top executive linked with their replacement or retention post 
acquisition, and 2) is the nature of the top executive in charge of managing an acquired firm 
associated with the subsequent approach to integration?   
Post-Acquisition Integration styles 
Whilst a number of post-acquisition organisational typologies exist, the majority examine 
cultural cohesion and differences (24) rather than organizational change. Haspeslagh and 
Jemison (1991) however, identify a number of distinct post-acquisition organisational styles 
with specific organizational change implications. Their framework is based upon two key 
dimensions: organisational autonomy and strategic interdependence.  
 
Organisational Autonomy is a central concept of organisational fit and is the extent to which 
the boundary of an acquired company‟s culture is preserved or dissolved. Where a boundary 
is disrupted there is negative impact on organisational culture (25). Where an acquired 
company‟s strategic capabilities are deeply embedded within its organisational culture, threats 
to its boundary, through loss of autonomy, are likely to result in damage to both culture and 
strategic capabilities (26). High levels of organisational autonomy are important then to 
protect acquired firms where strategic capabilities are deeply embedded in the company‟s 
culture (27). In such situations low levels of organisational change have been observed. 
Where the acquired company‟s strategic capabilities are not so embedded, there is less need 
for boundary protection and low levels of organisational autonomy are appropriate.  In these 
situations higher levels of organisational change have been observed. 
 
Strategic interdependence is linked to the concept of strategic fit and how interdependent the 
two firms should be in terms of capability transfer and resource sharing. The extent of 
interdependence is determined by how value is to be obtained for the acquirer. Low 
interdependence means value for the acquirer is realised through value capture, a one time, 
transaction related, event, involving shifting value from previous shareholders/ stakeholders 
to the acquiring firm‟s stakeholders. Frequently a financial gain (28), it may also include 
value purely in ownership and through no formal capability transfer (29). High 
interdependence means value for the acquirer is realised through value creation, a longer-term 
phenomenon resulting from executive action and the transfer of capabilities between firms 
through mechanisms of resource sharing, functional skills transfer and general management 
capability. Such transfer creates value that would not exist if the firms operated separately as 
these capabilities are immobile (30) and not easily exchanged on the markets (31). Capron et 
al. (1998) confirm this by showing resource redeployment post-acquisition is more intense 
where resources face greater market failure (32). The implications for post-acquisition change 
in the acquired company are high levels of change where there is high strategic 
interdependence and low levels of change where there is low strategic interdependence. 
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Organisational Autonomy and top executive change 
Higher levels of organisational autonomy suggest greater tolerance of corporate differences, 
low levels of organisational change and an increased likelihood of incumbent top executive 
retention. This view finds some support as organisational autonomy may be negatively 
associated with top executive turnover (33) and positively linked with acquired top executive 
retention (34). To preserve the acquired company‟s core competencies incumbents may be 
retained, or an Insider used, rather than the appointment of an Outsider which may have 
disruptive effects. Conversely low organisational autonomy is associated with high levels of 
post-acquisition change as there is little desire by the acquirer to maintain acquired company 
core competencies in their unique configuration. The acquirer will impose its own strategic 
view and is likely to use an Outsider to legitimise change. Outsiders would be less constrained 
than their Insider counterparts who are embedded in existing social systems (35) and subject 
to „organisational inertia‟. This lack of ties would give them greater discretion to take action 
in managing structural and procedural impediments to change. In situations of low 
organisational autonomy, Insiders would represent the old order and, as such, would be an 
obstacle to change. From this discussion the following hypothesis is derived:  
Hypothesis 1:  Post-acquisition organisational autonomy will be negatively  
associated with the appointment of Outsiders in the acquired company and 
positively associated with the retention of Insiders. 
 
Strategic interdependence and top executive change 
With increased interdependence the acquired company will experience greater levels of 
change. Transfers and sharing of resources and capabilities resulting from increased 
interdependence will disrupt the acquired company‟s configuration. The implication for top 
executives is that Insiders, who are highly associated with their firm‟s strategy and unique 
configuration, are likely to be less valuable to the acquirer where substantial resource transfer 
and sharing is intended. The Insider‟s value, stemming from embeddedness in the acquired 
company‟s social structure, will wane as their company‟s coherence fades. In order to bring 
about actual synergetic gains between two companies a new top executive drawn from outside 
the acquired company is likely. The Outsider will be closer to the parent board from the 
outset, aware of the conditions into which the acquired company should merge, can focus 
objectively upon realising synergies, will not be tied to previous ways of doing things, and 
may be better able to overcome organisational resistance in the acquired company. This is not 
to say that Insiders cannot begin to bring about synergetic interaction, but this may be 
restricted due to the limiting effects of their internal social ties. 
 
Where there is low resource transfer or sharing, the need for inter-organisational executive 
skills will be far less and greater value placed upon the acquired company being run 
effectively. For this reason Insiders are likely to be retained and Outsiders would be perceived 
to be an unnecessarily disruptive force. From this discussion the following hypothesis is 
derived: 
Hypothesis 2: Post-acquisition strategic interdependence will be positively   
associated with the use of Outsiders and negatively associated with Insiders in 
the acquired company.  
 
Post-acquisition integration styles and top executive type 
Bringing together the two dimensions, of Autonomy and Strategic Interdependence, results in 
Haspeslagh and Jemison‟s framework containing four distinct organisational integration 
styles described as Preservation, Absorption, Holding and Symbiotic
1
. 
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Two of these post acquisition integration styles, Preservation and Absorption acquisitions are 
coherent with the Hypotheses 1 and 2 in that the former (with low strategic interdependence 
and high levels of autonomy) is likely to be dominated by Insiders and the latter (with high 
levels of strategic interdependence and low levels of autonomy) is likely to be mostly run by 
Outsiders.  
 
Where there is contention between the framework axes is in situations of both i) low 
autonomy and low strategic interdependence (Holding acquisitions), where the former 
predicts the use of Outsiders and the latter, Insiders, and ii) high autonomy and high strategic 
interdependence (Symbiotic Acquisitions), where the former predicts the use of Insiders and 
the latter, Outsiders.    
 
Holding acquisitions have low levels of autonomy, as they are in poor financial health and 
require substantial organisational change in order to prevent collapse.  They have low levels 
of strategic interdependence, as there are concerns about the damage that may be caused to 
the parent firm by integrating a poor business. In situations where high levels of 
organisational change are necessary Outsiders should predominate. However, low levels of 
strategic interdependence suggest minimal interaction between parent and acquired company 
and the deployment of Insiders.  The question is whether the lack of integration with the 
acquiring firm is more important than the need to make substantial changes in the acquired 
company as the former would imply a dominance of Insiders and the latter would suggest the 
use of Outsiders. The related turnaround literature offers clues to this dilemma as ‘studies of 
corporate ‘turnarounds’ repeatedly confirm the necessity of hiring new chief executives in 
order to achieve strategic change and recovery’ (36). Whittington (2001) reviews several 
empirical studies showing that Outsiders dominate in situations of poor financial health. 
„Often managers recruited from outside the organisation are necessary to achieve the 
changes required for a turnaround, as Insiders are reluctant to impose radical change’ (37).  
Higher levels of organisational change, following the replacement of top management, is an 
enduring observation for companies needing to restructure (38). For these reasons Outsiders 
are likely to dominate in Holding Acquisitions. 
 
Hypothesis 3 Outsiders will predominate in Holding acquisitions 
 
Symbiotic acquisitions have high strategic interdependence, as value is created by inter-
organisational synergies, and high levels of autonomy, as its configuration is highly valued. 
This creates a paradox as valuable immobile capabilities embedded in the acquired company‟s 
culture necessitate high autonomy and low levels of change, whilst the intention to realise 
synergies through transferring capabilities requires high levels of interdependence and high 
levels of change. The paradox is how can the acquired firm be simultaneously autonomous 
and integrated?  For reconciliation Haspeslagh and Jemison introduce a temporal element into 
their framework by proposing that autonomy is critical for the acquired company at the outset, 
to protect acquired capabilities, but note that increasing interaction through capability transfer 
is necessary over time as both companies work toward a new organisational solution. It is 
likely that Insiders will be associated with the immediate post-acquisition period and 
Outsiders thereafter as the level of integration and organisational change increase. 
Hypothesis 4 Insiders will predominate in Symbiotic acquisitions in the intial stages and 
then Outsiders will predominate 
 
In summary this paper hypothesises that different types of top executive type will be 
associated with different post acquisition strategies. The outcome of this association will be 
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that acquired companies will experience different amounts of post acquisition change 
depending upon whether the top executive of the acquired company is an Insider or Outsider. 
This may be evident across different post acquisition strategies as well as within the same 
strategy where different types of top executive are present. There may also be differences by 
top executive type in terms of their perceptions of the success of the post acquisition 
strategies they are managing. Where we find strong associations between a particular top 
executive type and a post acquisition integration strategy we may find their views are more 
positive than for those top executives in the minority. 
 
Method 
In order to achieve generalisability of results across a population of acquisitions and gain 
explanation for links between the types of top executives and post-acquisition change, a 
medium grained hybrid method (39) with dual phase (dominant, less-dominant) design (40) 
was followed. A questionnaire was used to survey the acquisition population and generate a 
statistical „backbone‟ which was then informed and interpreted by subsequent qualitative 
interviews.  
The Questionnaire Survey 
Certain specified criteria were adopted in selecting UK corporate acquisitions. They were as 
follows: 
a) acquisition targets valued in excess of £8m (data on smaller deals is less complete and 
many are just assets rather than operating companies and so less instructive in post acquisition 
integration);  
b) domestic transactions (to avoid additional complication from national regulatory and socio-
cultural variations),  
c) stand alone targets (this allowed the acquirer to implement the full range of integration 
options and organizational changes. Including subsidiaries would have biased integration 
options as these firms could not stand alone);  
d) wholly owned targets (partial control would reduce the parent‟s ability to make changes);  
e) a corporate acquirer (other forms, such as private equity funds, individuals, management 
teams would not normally allow organizational interaction).  
 
By this process, from an initial list of 1390 acquisitions, derived from Acquisitions Monthly, 
232 met our stringent criteria of domestic, stand-alone operating company acquisitions.  
 
The questionnaire was then posted in stages to the top executives of our sample of 232 
acquired companies so that approximately two years had elapsed post closure - an appropriate 
length of time for a top executive to fully take charge (41). A telephone call followed ten days 
later to encourage response.  
 
The top executive of the acquired company was the focus of our attention for questionnaire 
survey and interview as they are the subject of our enquiry as well as possessing a strategic 
view of change in the post-acquisition period. Part of their job is to articulate events to group 
management and outside stakeholders and to take responsibility for post-acquisition change. 
As the critical interface between acquiring and acquired companies, their pivotal position 
makes them an important focus for data collection as „key informant‟. 
 
Examples of self-administered questionnaires to ascertain perceptions of key informants are 
numerous in the strategy literature (42) which gives credence to the efficiency and value of 
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this method. However, there are potential limitations which were addressed as follows. Every 
recipient was telephoned personally to check that they had actually filled in the questionnaire. 
To mitigate post-hoc rationalisation, internal company documents were checked for alignment 
with interview data. By focussing upon post-acquisition change a potential problem of self-
selection, that top executives are more influenced in their actions regarding success than other 
variables, may have been reduced. The very small numbers of acquisitions in the population 
which subsequently went into receivership or administration were very low so reducing the 
potential extent of survivor bias. 
Post acquisition changes 
To explore „changes‟ post-acquisition, two literatures were examined. First the turnaround 
literature and in particular the very rigorous „Sharpbender study‟ (43) with its substantial 
catalogue of organisational changes used to improved performance, and second the more 
organisationally based „taking charge‟ literature (44), were consulted. Forty nine 
organisational change variables from these two sources were disaggregated from original 
categories and re-ordered into the functions of finance, marketing, communications, human 
resources, operations, I.T., for the purposes of clarity in the questionnaire. Changes in top 
executives and their time in office were assessed by a separate question. 
 
Control Variables 
Previous research on executive successions has identified variables which may influence 
findings. These include top executive tenure (45), founder effects (46), experience in finance, 
prior qualifications, prior M&A experience (47) and management styles. Characteristics of 
the M&A may also affect findings. These include prior financial health of the acquired firm, 
whether the deal was public or private, friendly or hostile. Some of these items could be ruled 
out due to insufficient numbers of cases (friendly/hostile, founder effects). The remaining 
items were tested with chi-squared tests and only one item is associated with top executive 
type post acquisition and that is general management experience – the more experience the 
incumbent has the more likely they are to be retained in the acquired firm.
1
    
Respondents 
70 questionnaires were returned, a response rate of 30.17%, which is more than acceptable for 
surveys in the acquisition field (48). Of these 70 questionnaires, 66 questionnaires were 
usable and complete. It is also worth noting that previous researchers have generally argued 
that assessing top executives of acquired companies is a difficult, if not impossible, task (49).  
 
Responses were evenly distributed across SIC codes and equally split between private and 
public deals. The turnover data of acquired companies ranged from £1m to £230m (mean = 
£50m) and employed up to 3,829 employees (mean = 585). T-tests established no significant 
differences between responding sample and population based upon bid value, sales, and 
number of employees.  Confidence in the results is engendered by having responses from 
30.17% of the population, but systematic non-response bias cannot be ruled out. 
 
The sample of respondents represented four distinct top executive types as shown in figure 1. 
It should be noted that roughly one third of the acquisitions studied involved organisational 
outsiders. 
                                                 
1
 The authors adopted a conditional modelling strategy to control for acquisition size.  Control variables used 
include acquisition deal size (consideration), turnover and number of employees.  The results in the paper  were 
found to hold when such a conditional modelling strategy was adopted. 
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Figure 1    Responding sample by Insiders/Outsiders  
[Insert figure 1 about here] 
 
Constructing the contingency matrix 
Haspeslagh and Jemison‟s contingency framework was reconstructed by focusing upon the 
dimensions of „organisational autonomy‟ and „strategic interdependence‟.  
 
Organisational autonomy was assessed from a question which asked ‘to what extent do you 
feel that the acquired company is autonomous from the parent?‟ Although autonomy has been 
shown to be multi-dimensional, researchers have shown it to be highly correlated with 
respondent‟s perception of autonomy derived from a single question with a 5 point Likert 
scale (50). In this survey a score of one indicated very low autonomy and a score of five, very 
high autonomy.   
 
Strategic interdependence was assessed by three 5 point Likert scale questions. These asked 
i)‘to what extent has there been a transfer of physical assets (plant, machinery etc) between 
parent and acquired company?‟ ii) ‘to what extent has there been a transfer of knowledge and 
information between parent and acquired company?‟ iii)‘to what extent has there been a 
transfer of personnel between parent and acquired companies? A score of one indicated very 
low transfer/sharing, and a score of five, indicated very high transfer / sharing. The concept of 
combination benefits was not used as they do not relate to capability transfer and might have 
indicated greater interdependence than actually warranted. 
  
To test the first order hypotheses, linking top executive type and the framework dimensions of 
organisational autonomy and strategic interdependence (H1 , H2), tests were run on each 
strategic interdependence item. However, in order to investigate the second order hypotheses, 
a single score for strategic interdependence was necessary to enable the acquisitions to be 
plotted upon the integration framework. To achieve this, a „weak‟ and „strong form‟ of 
strategic interdependence was calculated. For the weak form, the highest score of any one 
measure was used, and for the strong form, the average of all three scores was used. Together 
with the autonomy score, firms could be located on weak and strong forms of the matrix.  
Interviews 
Once cases were mapped upon the contingency framework, interviews were used to uncover 
top executive explanations for patterns of change which had occurred in the acquired 
company post-completion. It is worth pointing out that it is exceptionally difficult to obtain 
interviews with top executives in the process of integrating acquired companies as they are 
generally extremely busy, very stressed and painfully aware that they are under intense 
pressure to achieve results under difficult circumstances.  
 
Six case interviews per strategic post-acquisition integration type were conducted for 
reasonable coherence (51) although fewer respondents for symbiotic acquisitions meant a 
smaller number of case interviews for this integration style. From the survey data it was 
apparent that Preservation, Absorption and Holding acquisition strategies have a dominant 
executive type. From each of these dominant groups thirteen case interviews were chosen 
randomly (four or five from each post acquisition type).  In order the „sharpen‟ the image so 
that consistent change actions are illuminated as well as divergent ones, a further five case 
interviews were selected of the minority or deviant groups (one or two per post acquisition 
type). With few Symbiotic cases three interviews were obtained. 
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A total of 21 interviews were conducted. They were semi-structured around the themes of the 
questionnaire, lasted around 1½ hours, were taped and transcribed. Brief anonymous details 
of interviewees are given in appendix 1. The data was analyzed using inductive qualitative 
techniques (52) informed by this study‟s focus on the changes made by top executives during 
acquisition integration. Accordingly, the analysis consisted of multiple readings of the 
interview transcripts, from which a rich set of change themes emerged for each post 
acquisition integration strategy (53). Measures were taken to ensure the reliability of this 
procedure and two coders -not related to this study- independently coded a subset of 
transcripts. A Cohen‟s kappa coefficient of consistency (54) was high, calculated at 0.82, for 
the particular themes
2
.  
 
Performance outcomes 
 
In order to assess whether there were performance outcomes associated with top executive 
type and post acquisition integration strategies two approaches were used. In the self-
assessment questionnaire top executives were asked to assess the success of the acquisition on 
5-point Likert scales for recovering the cost of capital, improving group profitability; 
achieving strategic objectives; technological synergies; operational integration; cultural 
integration, I.T. integration, gaining market share. These perceptions are indicative rather than 
highly precise measures of performance. Whilst it may be preferred to obtain more objective 
data on acquired firm performance this is a notorious difficulty in acquisition research. 
Acquired public firms frequently lose their listing on stock markets and so market data is 
unavailable. Acquired firm financial and accounting performance is generally impossible to 
obtain as this information is rarely reported separately post acquisition, being amalgamated 
within parent accounts and not for public inspection. Where acquired companies are 
significantly restructured post acquisition it is doubtful if figures, before and after this change, 
are meaningful.  The problem is widely recognised amongst researchers in the M&A field 
which explains why performance research tends to focus upon combined rather than acquired 
firm performance. There are studies which have assessed organizational performance in the 
absence of objective measures. Results suggest that top management subjective perceptions 
are strongly correlated with objective measures of firm performance (55). 
 
The second way in which performance is assessed is on the basis of a meta-performance 
outcome, namely the amount of post-acquisition organisational changes in the acquired firm 
by post-acquisition strategy and comparing these against top executive type. Meta outcomes 
are so named as they do not go as far as indicating financial outcome which is problematic in 
this sort of research. However as the purpose of investigating top executive type is to discover 
whether they are associated with levels of change in acquired companies, this is an 
appropriate outcome to assess.  
 
To refine further the patterns of change associated with top executive types, interview data 
enables comparison between dominant and deviant executive actions. For each post 
acquisition strategy, changes associated with the main type of top executive are contrasted 
with the changes carried out by the minority group in order to identify why a particular 
executive type might be in a minority in that situation.  
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Results 
Insiders / Outsiders and acquisition autonomy 
Hypothesis 1 suggested an association between top executive Insiders/Outsiders and the level 
of autonomy of the acquired company. As the sample size is small, and at the ordinal level, 
the non parametric Mann-Whitney U test, which does not require assumptions about the shape 
of the underlying distributions, was used to test this and subsequent hypotheses. A 
significance level of .1357 was recorded. This does not provide firm support for earlier 
research that top executive turnover is negatively associated with autonomy (56). A cross 
tabulation in table 1 also shows a statistically non-significant result, and reveals confounding 
detail.  
Table 1 Level of autonomy versus use of Insiders / Outsiders 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
High levels of autonomy generated the expected relationships with higher than expected 
levels of Insiders (residual = 2.1), and lower levels than expected of Outsiders (residual = –
2.1), than could be explained by chance alone. However, a reduction in the level of autonomy 
had only a very weak effect in lowering the percentage of Insiders used, and apparently none 
upon the use of Outsiders. Therefore all that can be said about hypothesis 1, that Insiders / 
Outsiders are associated with acquired company autonomy, is that the sign is in the right 
direction. 
Insiders / Outsiders and strategic interdependence 
Hypothesis 2 suggested a positive relationship between the presence of Outsiders and 
strategic interdependence. A Mann-Whitney U test shows Outsiders have a significantly 
higher mean rank (42.11) (sig.=.007) than Insiders (mean rank= 28.90) which indicates 
Outsiders are associated with a higher level of strategic interdependence
3
 than Insiders. 
Table 2 Mann-Whitney U test: Strategic Interdependence versus Insiders / Outsiders 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
Each of the three components of the strategic interdependence measure were also significantly 
and positively associated with the use of Outsiders.  
Table 3 Mann-Whitney U tests for strategic interdependence items against use of 
Insiders / Outsiders 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
These results support the second hypothesis that strategic interdependence is positively 
associated with the use of Outsiders and negatively associated with the use of Insiders in the 
acquired company. 
Insiders / Outsiders distribution on the contingency framework 
The Insiders and Outsiders were located in different post-acquisition styles (Figure 2).  
Figure 2 Distribution of Insiders and Outsiders 
[Insert figure 2 about here] 
 
The results from the first two hypotheses suggest consistency between Insiders, high levels of 
autonomy and low levels of strategic interdependence, both of which are associated with low 
levels of organisational change. This defines Preservation acquisitions and Insiders can be 
seen in figure 2 to dominate these acquisitions (75.0% of cases. Sig. at .005 level). Similarly, 
the results above suggest consistency between Outsiders, low autonomy and high strategic 
interdependence, both of which are associated with high levels of organisational change. This 
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defines Absorption acquisitions and Outsiders can be seen in figure 2 to dominate here 
(72.7% of cases. Sig. at .005 level).  
 
For Holding and Symbiotic acquisition styles there is a conceptual conflict between the 
relative importance of the framework dimensions and top executive type. In Holding 
acquisitions low autonomy predicts high change and the use of an Outsider and yet low 
strategic interdependence predicts little change and the retention of an Insider. As the 
literature review observed high levels of organisational change for Holding acquisitions, 
hypothesis 3 predicted Outsiders would dominate. However Figure 2 shows 82.4% of Holding 
cases retain Insiders (Sig. at .005 level). This indicates that strategic interdependence is a 
stronger determinant of top executive type than autonomy for Holding acquisitions.  
 
In Symbiotic acquisitions, the conflict between the demands of high autonomy and high 
strategic interdependence, in terms of organisational change and top executive type, were 
mitigated by introducing a temporal element. When cases were analysed by time in office 
since acquisition by top executive type, a Kendall Tau correlation showed a statistically 
significant difference at the .05 level
4
, between Insiders and Outsiders, with the former 
dominating the first 18 months (75.0% Insiders) and with the subsequent appointment of 
further Outsiders, the latter dominating thereafter (66.6% Outsiders).  This finding suggests 
that Insiders are more likely initially than Outsiders in symbiotic acquisitions. Similar tests 
were carried out on the other acquisition styles but no significant results were identified and 
correlations were low. 
 
Insider/Outsider perceptions of success by post acquisition strategy 
The results from hypothesis testing show associations between top executive type and 
different post-acquisition integration strategies (See table 4). There are significant differences 
between top executive type and their perceptions of success by post-acquisition integration 
strategy. The perceptual measure of success which shows significant differences between top 
executive types in all four post acquisition integration strategies is „Achieving Strategic 
Objectives‟. Specifically Insiders express more positive views than Outsiders in these terms in 
Preservation acquisitions (t=1.73, significance = 0.05). For the other three post acquisition 
integration strategies, Outsiders express more positive views (Absorption: t=3.26, significance 
= 0.01; Holding: t=2.77, significance = 0.01; Symbiotic t=2.33, significance = 0.03).  
Coherence amongst performance outcomes is maintained in Holding acquisitions where 
Outsiders express more positive views than Insiders on 5 out of 7 items (recovering the cost 
of capital (t= 2.31, significance= 0.02), operational integration (t= 2.16, significance= 0.02), 
cultural integration (t= 4.88, significance=0.00) and IT integration (t=1.73, significance= 
0.05). In Absorption acquisitions where Outsiders are more positive than Insiders in terms of 
Strategic Objectives, they are also more positive in terms of gaining market share ((t = 1.85, 
significance=0.05). For no items are Insiders more positive than Outsiders. In Preservation 
acquisitions, where Insiders are more positive than Outsiders in terms of Strategic Objectives, 
they are also more positive in terms of IT integration (t = 1.74, significance=0.05). For no 
items are Outsiders more positive than Insiders. Only in Symbiotic acquisitions is there 
variation between top executive type and positive outcome. Whereas Outsiders are more 
positive in strategic objective terms, Insiders are more positive on most other measures 
(recovering the cost of capital (t= 3.14, significance= 0.01), group profitability (t= 2.00, 
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significance= 0.04), operational integration (t= 2.45, significance= 0.02), and IT integration 
(t=3.00, significance= 0.01)). 
 
 
Table 4 Summary of results 
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
In summary, different top executive types are related to different approaches to post 
acquisition integration and this appears to have performance implications in terms of 
achieving strategic outcomes.  
Case findings 
This section explores each of the four post acquisition strategies in turn in order to focus upon 
change themes. Case interview data is used to reveal the main change themes for each post 
acquisition integration strategy. Comparison is then made between dominant and minority top 
executive groups in order to illuminate key differences in change initiatives between Insider 
and Outsider run firms in each post acquisition situation.  
Preservation Acquisitions 
Empirical results show Insiders‟ dominate Preservation acquisitions. Comparing the number 
of changes carried out post acquisition in preservation acquisitions by top executive type 
finds that Insiders introduce significantly less organizational changes than Outsiders 
(t=2.25, significance = 0.02). The main change themes which emerge are; i) a bias for action 
to pull the business back into shape; ii) business as usual; iii) piecemeal change; iv) 
defending from the new parent; v) lack of support from the acquirer. 
 
i) Insider are spurred into action by the feeling that acquisition negotiations distract them from 
managing their business. ‘It take’s your eye off the ball and you have to get back into the 
saddle’ (I3). They move quickly to reassert control. ‘I had to get re-involved. I freely admit I 
made changes as quickly as I could as I knew what had to be done (I1). Outsiders also feel the 
need to pull businesses back into shape after ownership changes hands. In all cases parent 
financial reporting systems are adopted immediately along with a small amount of 
management and operational pruning. 
 
ii) After the initial flurry of activity, top executives say post-acquisition is really business as 
usual with low levels of substantive change to the acquired firm. Even though some 
anticipate significant change to be imposed from the acquirer it did not materialise; 
‘Everybody expected a big wave of change but it never happened’ (I1).The main emphasis 
was to keep things as they are and preserve the core.  ‘They (the acquirer) didn’t interfere 
with the business. They just let me run the company’ (I2). ‘There wasn’t that much to 
change ’cause my business was very successful’ (I3). „The company was basically sound. 
There wasn’t much that needed changing’ (O1). 
 
iii) When changes are made they occur piecemeal according to acquired business needs rather 
than following a plan of change or instructions from the parent. ‘We were making changes 
because I thought it was appropriate to make changes. It was not the parent telling us (I1). 
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Changes „would have happened even if we had stayed independent. Most changes are market 
driven. There was nothing for them (the parent) to do’ (I2). 
iv) Top executives agree on how they have to defend their businesses from parental 
interference. ‘My major role throughout was defending the customers and the business from 
the owners’(I1).  Many realise that keeping to budgets is a successful mechanism for ‘fighting 
the corporate immune system’. ‘The budget is the bible. If we are keeping within budget, they 
don’t interfere. They say, ‘go ahead, run your business, you’re the experts, we trust you’. 
When things go wrong, they get heavy’(I3). Good performance is the main weapon for 
resisting parental initiatives. „We had a good track record both on performance and budgets 
so we could say, ‘look, we know our business. These numbers are bizarre, and we rubbished 
the numbers’(I4). 
v) Whilst investment is wildly anticipated, parental support is generally limited and rare. 
‘They (the parent) had no clear pattern of what they were trying to achieve and I’ve learnt 
that they’re going to do nothing, so you bloody well get on with it and keep your head down. 
After-care was non-existent’(I1). „The owners contributed absolutely nothing to the business 
at any stage (I4)’  ‘I decided to keep out of the way and let them carry on with the politics up 
there and just produce results; there’s nothing better than just producing results’ (I1).’The 
parent didn’t bring anything (to the acquired company)’(O1).  
Outsiders in preservation acquisitions 
Whilst both type of top executive agreed on main themes of change in Preservation 
acquisitions, the minority group, Outsiders, instigated more organisational changes than the 
dominant group, Insiders. Preservation acquisitions are companies in good shape so whilst all 
top executives perceive the need to engage in immediate change to pull the business back into 
shape, Outsiders inherit a situation where the loss of the incumbent is likely to leave a 
vacuum. „She was completely autocratic which meant that there was a complete vacuum 
beneath her – there was no management at all when I got there’. Outsiders need to appoint 
key people and spend time understanding the business and its employees before acting. ‘I did 
nothing before I arrived and then I had to go very slowly, very sensitively because of the 
nature of the employees – they are in the top 1% of intelligence, ultra conservative and very 
powerful’. Outsiders can experience significant resistance from employees loyal to the 
previous top executive, and protective of their ways of doing things. ‘There were lots of 
hidden agendas ‘We’ve always done it this way. Don’t interfere boss’’. This requires 
significant communication.  ‘I had to improve communications and put myself around a lot. 
They were very, very suspicious of me’. ‘I had to split the employees up and pick them off – it 
was hard work. I was just hammering away’. Outsiders make far deeper cuts in the 
organisation than Insiders and these are often sacred cows. ‘Because their IT system was 
invented in-house, they were loathed to admit that it needed to be more efficient’. I had to cut 
costs and reconfigure it. Over 7 months I cut about 1/8
th
 of the workforce and combined three 
departments into one’. This intense internal focus also has consequences as „we lost a major 
customer because I was so focused internally’. 
Preservation acquisitions are about maintaining the status quo. Executives that disrupt the 
existing balance are likely to reduce the overall success of the acquisition. Outsiders seem to 
struggle with managing change in this context as they have to build credibility with resentful 
workforces and work hard to understand how acquired companies works. As they carry out 
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more and deeper changes than Insiders they are likely to be more disruptive of business and 
less successful in this context.  
Absorption Acquisitions 
Outsiders dominate Absorption acquisitions. Comparing the number of changes carried out 
post acquisition Outsiders introduce significantly more organizational changes than Insiders 
(t=2.25, significance = 0.03). The main change themes which emerge are  i) taking hold ii) a 
planning and assessing period iii) high levels of subsequent change for a) reducing duplicate 
activities and operating costs b) imposing parent systems and structures iv) reviewing and 
fine tuning change. 
 
i) Taking hold requires immediate changes to signal to stakeholders that things are now 
different. This is critical and includes removing barriers to change through a) substantial 
levels of communication to manage acquired employee perceptions; b) removing corporate 
identity; c) imposing parent financial controls; d) changing senior executives and boards.  
ia) Massively increasing the amount and richness of internal communication in the acquired 
company to convey the new situation is perceived as vital. „Their world (the employees’) is in 
turmoil - they’re all down to the bottom layer of Maslow: ‘how do I feed my family’? Don’t 
bullshit them. Be honest and open and be available’ (O3 ). All interviewees were heavily 
involved in disseminating information. „I visited every single office of both companies 
throughout this country in a three day period and spoke to as many staff as they could get in. 
As soon as it was done, I got to all the overseas offices as well. It was a major exercise’ (I6). 
As another top executive put it,’ you have to have meetings ranging from the stadium to 
behind the skip – you have to touch everyone’ (O2).  
ib) Another area of immediate change is removing corporate identity ranging from removing / 
destroying sculptures / monuments / flags / office signs to supplanting crests on stationary. 
Adverts appear immediately in the media announcing change in ownership - ‘product x, now 
part of the y group’. Security guard uniforms change and ‘our receptionists, telephonists and 
secretaries were ‘sent to college’ to learn the ‘new greeting’. The spirit is very much, ‘the 
King is dead, long live the King’ (O5).  
ic) Imposing parent financial controls is universal and urgent in order to establish a common 
language and to be able to identify clearly areas for cost reduction. „Our accountancy 
personnel went in there straight away’ (O6). ‘Until you turn the lights on, you can’t see where 
you’re going’ (O3).  
id) In all cases there were significant changes in top management in the acquired company. 
„We don’t need a board of directors floating around and I think they knew that. It was the 
operational guys that we might want to keep’ (O4). ‘Its easy – you just get rid of the 
management and integrate it’ (O4). Even where incumbent top management was retained 
there were changes. „We didn’t need two company secretaries or two warehouse directors’ 
(I5) 
 
ii) The planning and assessing period is intense. ‘We didn’t know enough to go in there day 
one and suddenly do things’(O4). ‘After making the obvious quick changes we then said, 
‘Right, what’s next?’ – ‘Let’s think about it’ (I6). Extensive use is made of integration teams, 
task forces, joint committees and parallel working to better evaluate the acquired firm in order 
to evaluate areas for rationalisation. „The planning took some months and a task force went in 
and worked jolly hard’ (O5). For two months ‘the marketing guys of both companies were 
hard at work in hotel rooms laying down the plans – they were working hand in hand and in 
the end they agreed on a plan (I5). ‘We had people working side by side over that period of 
time running the same activity’ (O4). The purpose of this parallel working was ‘to create 
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some interface between the organizations to allow the planning process to proceed’ (O4). „I 
spent two months ghosting the management and asked what they thought compared with the 
earlier ball park paper’ (O4). ‘In about six to eight weeks we had blitzed it and worked out 
how we were going to operate’ (O5). 
 
iii) The drive for efficiency gains result in high levels of subsequent change to reduce 
duplicate activities and operating costs. ‘It was obvious that we would only operate with one 
office and I’m sure somebody would have told me from on high if I’d said that we needed to 
keep two Head Offices going’(O4). ‘In one town, they had a depot, we had a depot, I mean 
it’s easy as that - you don’t have two depots, you have one’ (O5). „We closed down one of 
their factories which was running at 60% capacity whilst ours, three times the size, was 
running at 70% capacity. You bang the whole thing in and it runs at 100% capacity. So it just 
made sense’ (O4). The changes were extensive and often traumatic in nature. ‘There were 
some revolutions, there had to be. We completely merged the sales forces and there was 
competition for position and some our guys didn’t make it, which was sad as they had been 
with us for a long time.’ (I5). ‘A lot of people were banging tables saying we’ve got to get 
costs out. We ought to be able to run this lean and efficient. We don’t have all those people, 
so we kicked them all out’ (O4). 
iiib) Parent systems and structures are always imposed: ‘We know broadly the structure that 
we (the parent) want’ (O4). ‘They were on the attack, they were straight off, it was laid down 
(by the acquirer head office)’ (I5). ‘Accounting went in there right away. Every single team 
had an accountant from head office ensuring that objectives were being met. We now have 
one system, the (parent) system’. [Interviewer] ‘It sounds as if you went in on day one saying 
this is how we would like to run our accounts?’ ‘Yes – we made 200 people redundant in six 
months’ (O6). ‘The parent company doesn’t like HR directors so that poor chap (HR director 
of acquired firm) was dealing with people who were saying ‘What do you do HR director?’ 
We were looking at him like some prehistoric animal. We outsource all HR activities’ (O6). 
‘We were pretty successful and had a winning formula. We knew we were doing it right and 
that everybody else did it wrong, so we just imposed our culture totally on the target…. you 
haven’t got to have a debate about which computer system is best - you just go in and shut 
theirs down and transfer your own’ (O3). ‘They were so entrenched in their ways that they 
were completely oblivious to looking at anything that we had done (I5). 
 
iv) For all top executives there was a final period of reviewing and fine tuning. ‘At the end of 
the first year there was a taking stock of how well we had done, and a further rationalisation 
which was not in the plan and was completed in a further six months’ (O6). ‘After twelve  
months it is a period of refinement and getting things done’ (O5). ‘There were certainly some 
changes we made that we changed again after the first year (I6). 
Insiders in Absorption Acquisitions 
Whilst both type of top executive agree on the main themes of change in Absorption 
acquisitions, the minority group, Insiders differ from Outsiders in presiding over fewer 
organisational changes. Insiders can discuss with acquirer what might be changed in more 
detail earlier in the acquisition process, pre-completion, than is possible for Outsiders thus 
reducing post acquisition planning phase and allowing some smaller changes to occur more 
rapidly. „Not every problem was solved but we had a pretty clear idea of which individuals 
would fit into which slot. We had a lot sorted before we pushed the button’. The emphasis for 
Insiders is more on ‘evolution rather than revolution and trying to minimise fall-out’. They 
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are more concerned with the ‘risk of destabilising the business if things are pushed along too 
fast. It’s much more important to get it right than to do it quick’. ‘It would have been quicker 
with a guy from the acquirer’. „You have to work progressively and sensibly and avoid 
upsetting things’. ‘The acquired business was run separately for 9 months and only then 
pulled together – and it was very difficult’. For these reasons changes were fewer than with 
Outsiders who did not have the same regard for the acquired business. ‘I think we felt the 
changes were pretty substantial and it needed a new person, new blood, to implement that. If 
the management had just stayed the same, although they bought into the changes, I think they 
would have found it very difficult when push came to shove, to actually do it’ (O6). When 
asking Insiders why they might be used in Absorption acquisitions it is clear from their 
response that they feel that Outsiders are appropriate in this context.  
From the interview data it can be seen that Absorption acquisitions result in massive change 
to the acquired company in order that maximum areas of synergy between both firms can be 
achieved. Executives who do not engage in major change to achieve as many synergies as 
possible, by defending some areas for instance, are likely to reduce the overall success of this 
type of acquisition. In this context it is Outsiders who are carrying out the most change to the 
acquired firm and they would seem to be the right executive for the task.  
Holding Acquisitions 
Whilst we hypothesise that Outsiders should dominate over Insiders in Holding acquisitions, 
as this integration approach requires significant change to the acquired company, evidence 
presented in this paper shows Insiders dominate. In comparing the number of changes 
carried out post acquisition Insiders introduce significantly more organizational changes 
than Outsiders (t=2.25, significance = 0.03) which might be viewed as counter intuitive. The 
main themes emerging for top executives in Holding Acquisitions are i) speed of action ii) 
imposition of tight controls iii) carry out high levels of change to achieve turnaround in 
financial health iv) change top executive strategic perspective from medium to short term v) 
post-acquisition lull beyond recovery. 
 
i) Speed of action is vital to reverse the poor financial health of these acquisitions. Critical are 
‘stabilising the workforce, stopping capital expenditure, stopping financial misuse, putting 
immediate controls on the finances and putting in place the parent required financial 
systems’(I8). Insiders are often prepared and can act very quickly ‘I had been thinking about 
making changes for months and I had got a blueprint already in place and I just pressed the 
button’(I10). Clarity of purpose and speed of action are key; ‘have a clear idea and do it. 
You’ll get lots wrong, but that doesn’t actually matter. People want clarity’ (I7). 
 
ii) Tight controls are imposed focussing on overhead and production costs as areas for quick 
improvements. ‘The rationale for the changes was of course the company was making 
losses basically because the overheads and the management overheads were too big‟ ( 
I11).The imposed controls are absolutely rigorous aiming at short term improvements ‘I 
wouldn’t let any of the controls slip. I wouldn’t tolerate any departure. We don’t let that get 
away’ (O7). Everything has to be performance monitored. Everything is very, very 
accountable. There is accountability for everything and everybody. We didn’t have that 
before’ (I8). ‘They implemented an unprecedented set of financial and accounting systems – 
it was a big shock’ (I11). 
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Many acquired company Managing Executives complain about the stringency and 
unyielding nature of parental controls which seem to have little bearing upon their business. 
‘We were constrained by the parent company, not free to make decisions in the best 
interests of our business. The parent company imposed rigid expenditure controls’(I10). 
‘We were treated like nothing’ (I7). Often the constraints and severity of these new controls 
forced the top executive into making major changes in order to meet budget although with 
damaging medium term consequences. 
 
iii) To achieve turnaround in financial health there are high levels of change including 
focusing upon meeting budget, changing senior management, restructuring divisions, 
rationalising assets, cutting expenditure in marketing, R&D. ‘There were a lot of managers 
– it was very top heavy so we removed a lot of them’ (O7). ‘It was incredibly badly managed 
– sort of bleeding to death – so I cut staff immediately’ (I9)5. ‘We closed down the head 
office which was very expensive and opulent – a major task (O7). ‘There were too many 
divisions and not enough activity so we had a fairly quick restructuring into sales and 
purchasing’ (O7). ‘We had to change a lot of things but it tended to be what is convenient – 
what’s easiest to get rid of’ (I7). The severity of imposed changes are indicated by ‘cut 
back, cut back, cut back - but if that’s what they want, profit, I’ll give them profit, or reduce 
losses’(I10 ).  
 
iv) top executives found their strategic horizons collapsing from medium to short term under 
the pressure to produce quick results. ‘I found the reductions in development and marketing 
spend hardest because it was hitting the future of the company. I was putting a great line 
through my own strategy. The instruction from the parent company was get back to budget’ 
(I10).  ‘I said the cost of sacking these people in money terms is X but more importantly in 
terms of achieving our strategy it’s XYZ and means putting back our strategy quite severely. 
What he said is ‘I want profit (I8)’!  „I had a futile role as Managing Director’(I10). 
 
v) Post-acquisition there is a lull once the acquired firm recovers - as if acquirers lose interest. 
Acquired firms feel no sense of strategic direction, with no one driving synergies. ‘We were 
left in a complete vacuum. All we did was carry on’ (I10). ‘We didn’t feel valued’ (I11). 
„There was no discussion of strategy. Nobody came to me and said, ‘You’ve built this thing up 
over the last 20 years, what do you want out of it?’ (I8). ‘There was no attempt to motivate 
the staff’. ‘It was just ‘Carry on’’. ‘People came to me and said, ‘What now?’, ‘What are they 
going to do; how can they help us?’ and I said, ‘I have no idea - I’m sure it will all become 
clear’ - but it never did’ (I10). 
Outsiders in Holding Acquisitions 
Holding acquisitions are about saving the acquired business and returning it to an even keel. 
This requires significant short term changes to the acquired firm. Insiders seem to be faster at 
implementing changes to their businesses than Outsiders as they are able to prepare for action 
and are also more aware of how to bring about change whilst Outsiders have to learn what to 
do. The deviant outsider‟s comments illustrate how more time is needed for planning. ‘The 
company was dead on its feet so we quickly drew up a plan’ ‘How long did that take?‟ 
(interviewer) ‘About three months’. ‘When we took the action a lot of people would always 
say ‘well why on earth didn’t you do this earlier’?  
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The Outsider also explains why it was difficult to make changes immediately in all areas. 
Although it was known from negotiations and due diligence that ‘the company was making a 
loss, it was only when taking charge that we realised that we have to remove a lot of top 
management. It wasn’t done to begin with - it wasn’t something you could see – you had to 
look at it. Its only when you can actually get into the company – it takes a lot of time to get 
inside relationships between managers’. ‘It took a year of actually working with them, rather 
than taking an initial view’. Integrating themselves and working with employees is one of the 
big challenges which face Outsiders. ‘Many managers didn’t get on with me or didn’t get on 
with my way of doing things’. This meant that significant efforts were required to maintain 
good relations. ‘I’ve always been extremely careful to try and preserve the goodwill’.    
In asking the Outsider why he was brought in, the response was because ‘we didn’t think the 
chairman and managing director of the company were doing a good job and there was a lot 
of reorganization to be done – a lot of changes to be made. I was a jobbing accountant who 
did insolvency and turnarounds’.  
Whilst Outsiders were hypothesized to be the right choice for running these businesses, it is 
Insiders who are found to make the most changes in this context and this would appear to be 
the right approach for restoring balance.  
 
 
Symbiotic Acquisitions 
Insiders in Symbiotic acquisitions occur at the outset and later the balance changes to 
Outsiders. Key change themes which emerge from the interview data are i) Maintain 
distinctive characteristics in the acquired company at the outset; ii) Build trust in the 
acquirer and work towards partnership; iii) Transfer resources to create value and recognise 
dynamics of situation. 
 
i) Maintain distinctive characteristics is vital for protecting the quality of the acquired 
business. „The senior management level were effectively running the company and running 
it well – we wanted to keep them in place’ (O9). ‘We didn’t want to lose the distinctiveness – 
we had competencies in each firm that are not the same. We wanted to highlight, 
demonstrate that both companies had clear focus, objectives and briefs’ (O8). ‘The group 
CEO said in his board presentation that it is absolutely fundamental to have my cooperation 
over the first year’ (I12) 
 
ii) In order to build trust and work towards partnership the acquirer would invest and also 
give the acquired firm a lot of autonomy. ‘We let them be their own masters’(O9). ‘In the 
first six months we wanted to give a very strong signal that we were keeping the companies 
separate to give confidence and commitment to people in both companies. In the acquired 
company there’s an awful lot of insecurity and you’ll lose the good ones first if you can’t 
give them confidence’. ‘The very first changes we made were completely renovating the 
office block because it was the pits – I mean literally buckets on the floor to stop water 
coming in. It was an investment – a big sign but didn’t cost us a fortune. It was a very, very 
important signal’ (O8). Even where there were a few redundancies ‘they received a very, 
very generous package – way over the odds. Everybody was extremely well treated as they 
wanted full cooperation’ (I12). 
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iii) To create value resources need to transfer but in a sensitive way so that the acquired 
company is not damaged.  Initially this means symbiotic companies are kept separate. ‘We 
did say at the outset that we were not going to come in make wholesale change. One sees 
companies who say ‘the new company will just run our systems’. I know we didn’t do that. 
I’m glad we didn’t do it and I think we are smart not to do it’ (O8). ‘It would be absolutely 
typical of the way the relationship worked, that we would listen on both sides and pick what 
we thought was best from both worlds. There was this incredibly harmonious trust with no 
hang-ups’(I12).  Later after significant joint consultation transfers and integration begin. 
‘We are now at the end of year two and looking seriously at transferring resources’ (O8). 
When asked why change starts after some time responses are „we simply did not want to 
unsettle the company – we don’t want to come in with big heavy boots on because we don’t 
fully understand the business and we want it to continue successfully’(O9). The top 
executives in these acquisitions are sensitive to the dynamics of the situation. ‘We had a 
plan but were alive enough to the dynamics of the situations to say that just because we had 
a blueprint we didn’t have to stick to it – we judged changes in terms of the continuing 
development of both the companies’(O8).  
 
From the interview data it can be seen that Symbiotic acquisitions are about maintaining the 
status quo in the first instance and then incrementally changing through a collaborative 
process with the parent company. Executives which disrupt the existing balance in the first 
instance are likely to reduce the overall success of the acquisition and in this context it is 
Insiders who would appear to be most appropriate. However as the need for change increases 
over time it would seem that Outsiders are more appropriate for this role and we find that the 
change in dominance is reflected in the data.  
Case findings summary 
Different top executive types are related to different approaches to post acquisition 
integration. These differences extend to within post acquisition integration strategies. Case 
interviews illuminate the main themes of each post acquisition strategy and the differences 
between the use of Insider or Outsider within the same strategy. This would appear to have 
performance implications in both the amount of change carried out as well as perceptions of 
success, particularly in terms of achieving strategic outcomes. 
Discussion and interpretation 
Relating top executive type to autonomy 
A positive relationship between the use of Insiders and level of autonomy is observed. 
Acquired companies are granted high levels of autonomy when they are perceived to be well 
run businesses. For this reason all attempts are made to retain top management as they are 
integral to the core competencies of the acquired company which may be damaged if they are 
lost. In many cases the acquirer may lack in-situ experience and not want to take the risk of 
bringing in Outsiders who could destabilize a good operation.  
 
The relationship between Insiders and low autonomy is less well defined. Low autonomy 
suggests acquired company configuration is not highly valued and will be changed. Often 
these acquired companies are in poor financial health prior to acquisition. Even though 
Insiders are intimately linked with this history, many remain to carry out substantial changes 
dictated by the new parent as they are best placed to act quickly through working ties and 
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alliances. Outsiders have to spend significant time establishing these links and this may be a 
significant disadvantage when time is of the essence. There are personal consequences for 
Insiders in making very severe changes to their organisation which is reflected in interview 
data showing substantial deterioration in their self esteem. Insiders could feel their strategic 
horizons collapsing as they are forced to concentrate upon short term profitability. Often this 
is perceived as writing off previous strategies and undermining everything they had worked 
for. 
 
There is no evidence to support Outsiders being negatively related to levels of autonomy. This 
is hard to explain as Outsiders‟ objectivity about change might be more valuable where the 
core competencies of the acquired firm are not highly valued.  It would seem that acquirers 
may find setting levels of autonomy difficult and tend to underestimate the problems of 
retaining Insiders for making fundamental change in poorly performing companies. The 
success outcomes seem to suggest that Outsiders may be more appropriate in these situations. 
Relating top executive type to strategic interdependence 
Outsiders are positively associated with strategic interdependence. Where this is high the 
acquirer will transfer its superior capabilities to the acquisition and remove areas of 
duplication. High strategic interdependence requires new perspectives and substantial change 
to the fabric of the acquired company. Outsiders are appropriate for this task as they are 
prepared to make radical changes, are more objective and lack the emotional attachments of 
Insiders to the acquired business. 
 
In low strategic interdependence situations, Insiders predominate. This is understandable in 
financial asset terms as value capture deals; where value is gained through the market rather 
than internally through exchange. Insiders remain as the acquired business will not integrate 
with the new parent. This hands-off approach from the parent is typified by Insiders 
remarking upon a lack of direction from above. Whilst the frustration and confusion amongst 
Insiders over low strategic interdependence is tangible, it is a reflection of a lack of 
engagement with the acquirer. 
Top executives and post-acquisition integration strategies 
A resource based perspective helps interpret the prevalence of Insiders in Preservation and 
Outsiders in Absorption acquisitions. Preservation acquisitions are about value capture and 
retaining the valuable and unique configuration of the acquired company, including its 
incumbent executives. The dominant top executive type is Insider as they generally remain 
in place to maintain the status quo. The changes to Preservation acquisitions are therefore 
minor and focus upon pulling the business back into shape, normal operations and 
piecemeal changes, driven more by markets than the wishes of the acquirer. Indeed 
intervention from the parent is resisted as potentially damaging to the acquired firm and its 
customers. Outsiders are likely to be less appropriate in this context as they are not familiar 
with the business and not embedded socially. They need to expend effort in trying to 
understand how the business works and how change may be brought about through sensitive 
engagement with employees and customers. They are likely to experience employee 
resistance and this may distract them from their customers. With less capacity to act quickly 
and more likely to bring about disruptive changes to the core competencies of the firm, 
Outsiders are less appropriate in Preservation acquisitions. Indeed from the perceptions of 
strategic success, Insiders seem more successful in this context as their firms are less likely 
to be altered substantially and value destroyed. 
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Absorption acquisitions create value through restructuring the acquired company to 
integrate fully with the new parent. This boundary disruption requires radical change and 
new perspectives in the acquired company. Outsiders can bring fresh views as they have 
different backgrounds to the incumbent top team. Outsiders are less reluctant to impose 
radical change as they lack emotional ties to the acquired firm and are more likely to see 
things in a more objective light. Outsiders are associated with high levels of change which 
focus upon de-duplicating activities and imposing parent systems and structures in order to 
improve collective efficiency. This is likely to be highly disruptive of the acquired business 
and something which Insiders would try to reduce. Insiders are the deviant group in 
Absorption acquisitions as they carry out less change and may present an obstacle to 
aggressive alterations in their firm as they will have allegiances to the business and its 
employees. In this context Outsiders have more positive views of the strategic success of 
their acquisitions than Insiders as they are more likely to focus upon synergetic changes 
between both firm rather than the integrity of the acquired firm on its own. 
 
Holding acquisitions exhibit high levels of organisational change which include instigating 
change rapidly, imposing tight controls, carrying out high levels of change to achieve 
turnaround and focusing upon short term results. This aggressive change, reminiscent of 
turnarounds, suggests Outsiders would be prevalent but Insiders dominate. The reason may 
be that organisational changes are largely internal to the acquired firm rather than at the 
boundary.  Insiders, unlike Outsiders, are already embedded in effective social networks 
which allow them to act rapidly and extensively and this is particularly important when the 
acquired company is in poor condition and needing urgent treatment. Insiders know exactly 
how to bring about change and also are able to plan actions even before ownership changes. 
Outsiders are the deviant group here because they take longer to build effective networks for 
action. This is contrary to the turnaround literature which argues that for turnarounds to be 
successful there needs to be change in top management due to its close association with 
prior strategy. Interestingly the perceptions of success amongst Holding top executives 
shows Outsiders scoring more highly on several measures. This may be explained by 
Outsiders being more objective in their changes to the acquired firm. Whilst Insiders have 
the advantage of being able to act quickly and make many changes, they may not be 
tackling fundamental issues in their flurry of activity, preferring changes within an existing 
paradigm rather than contemplating revolutionary change. Insiders may unwittingly be 
allowing problems to continue as well as being demoralised by destroying much of what 
they had previously achieved.  
 
In order to reconcile the contradictory indications from the axes of strategic interdependence 
and autonomy, it would seem that the lack of strategic interdependence has a greater 
influence than autonomy on the choice of top executive type in Holding acquisitions. 
Perhaps for the acquirer the fear of integrating a poorly performing firm and its potential for 
damaging the parent outweighs the fear of maintaining a poor set of core competencies in 
the acquired business.  
 
In Symbiotic acquisitions results showed a change in balance with Insiders dominating in the 
first 18 months and Outsiders dominating thereafter. Insiders are used initially to stabilise and 
maintain the distinctive characteristics of the acquired company, so valuable configuration is 
not lost. Substantial efforts are then made to build trust between the two firms and change 
initiatives begin to switch towards the boundary. This is where Outsiders are then employed 
as they are more sensitive to the dynamic nature of two evolving organizations. Outsiders are 
 22 
more likely to be comfortable with radical inter-organisational change where they can bring 
fresh perspectives to bear. For Symbiotic acquisitions, autonomy is initially dominant as a 
constraint upon integration, which favours the use of Insiders. However as strategic 
interdependence becomes increasingly important for longer-term value creation, Outsiders are 
more appropriate as willing advocates of fundamental realignments. 
 
In summary, a strong association between top executive type and strategic interdependence is 
apparent and the distinction between value capture and value creation of key importance. 
Value capture acquisitions (Holding and Preservation) are about change focussing internally 
within the acquired firm and here Insiders dominate. Value creation acquisitions (Absorption 
and Symbiotic) are about change at the boundary and here Outsiders dominate (immediately 
in the case of Absorption and over time in Symbiotic acquisitions). The weak association of 
autonomy with top executive type is a refinement and an important clarification relative to 
earlier studies. This suggests decisions over top executive type are influenced more by an 
intentional activity of resource transfer/sharing, than concerns over boundary protection and 
autonomy. The choice of top executive in a post-acquisition context may, therefore, be driven 
more by strategic intentions of how value is captured or created rather than organisational fit 
considerations of how much autonomy top executives should have in managing acquired 
firms.  
 
The wider implication of the findings for the study of M&A in performance terms is to 
explain why so many studies struggle to find clear correlations between top executive type 
and post acquisition outcomes (10). The results show substantial variation in usage of top 
executive types across a contingency framework. There are also very different change patterns 
associated with these top executives across and within integration strategies. These variations 
are likely to confound studies of performance which treat all acquisition integration as 
homogeneous and assume one type of top executive should be superior to the other. Different 
types of top executive are more appropriate in some integration strategies than others so that 
strengths noted for Insiders for instance (c.f. 11, 12) may be beneficial in Preservation 
acquisitions but actually harmful in Absorption acquisitions, and visa versa. In terms of top 
executive retention, in order to understand why top executives may stay or go (c.f. 4, 5) 
cannot be determined by assuming all acquisitions are the same, but only by being sensitive to 
the ways in which acquired companies are managed. This variation in usage has multiple 
implications for acquirer and acquired firms as the top executive is a major conduit for power 
and information between both organizations. The type of top executive may influence how 
acquirers may value the resources and capabilities of the acquired firm; their ability and 
capacity to learn from the acquisition (57); how much influence the acquired firm may have 
with the parent in subsequent integration decisions (58); the speed with which the parent can, 
and should, integrate the acquisition (59). The findings also suggest that there are 
consequences for using the wrong type of executive for a particular integration approach. In 
some circumstances this may be unavoidable but raises the issue of the extent to which 
misallocation of top executive may harm acquired firm performance.    
 
 
Conclusion 
This paper set out to examine the link between top executive prior organisational background 
and different post-acquisition strategies. In particular whether 1) the nature of the top 
executive links with removal or retention post acquisition, and whether 2) the nature of the 
top executive in charge of managing an acquired firm associates with different integration 
strategies. 
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Through the use of a novel hybrid methodology consisting of survey and interviews, 
acquisitions were mapped onto a contingency framework in order to distinguish their different 
post-acquisition integration strategies. The relationship was then examined between different 
types of top executive, determined by their prior organisational background, and the main 
dimensions of a post-acquisition integration framework: organisational autonomy and 
strategic interdependence. Top executive types were then compared with different post 
acquisition strategy and comparisons made between their actions within each integration 
approach. 
  
This paper provides empirical support for top executive prior organisational background 
being linked with different post-acquisition strategies. In particular, the level of the acquired 
company‟s strategic interdependence from the parent seems key with high levels of strategic 
interdependence being associated with the use of Outsiders and low levels with Insiders. As 
high levels of strategic interdependence are related to value creation, achieved through 
managerial action across company boundaries, Outsiders are appropriate top executives as 
they can readily bring in new perspectives to the acquired company and integrate across 
activities across organisational boundaries. Where there is low strategic interdependence and 
value from the acquisition is captured rather than created, Insiders predominate. In these 
acquisitions there is little need for a top executive to manage across boundaries. The emphasis 
is upon managing internal changes rapidly in order to improve the performance of the 
acquisition in the short term. For this purpose, the Insider, already embedded in working 
social networks is an appropriate choice for managing the acquisition.  
 
Prior research (43) suggests that organisational autonomy is negatively associated with top 
management change. From the data presented in this paper this association is less clear. 
Whilst high levels of autonomy are associated with Insiders rather than Outsiders, in order to 
maintain acquired firm‟s distinctive capabilities, the reduction in autonomy level was not so 
clearly associated with changes in top executive balance. An explanation may be that setting 
appropriate levels of autonomy for an acquired company is difficult to handle. 
 
In terms of different post acquisition strategies, Insiders dominate in Preservation acquisitions 
where the maintenance of distinctive capabilities is critical for performance. In these 
acquisitions it is likely that acquired Insiders are dissimilar in skills from acquiring 
management. In Absorption acquisitions Outsiders dominate as acquired company synergy 
benefits are to be found from full organisational integration with the acquirer. In these 
acquisitions the distinctiveness of the acquired firm is less valuable than the commonalities 
between firms. It is more important for profound adjustment of the acquired firm than 
maintaining its uniqueness and so Insiders, who are more likely to hinder integration through 
trying to preserve the acquired firm‟s integrity, are less valuable. Outsiders are more willing 
to impose radical changes for the needed alignment of acquired company with new parent.  
 
The predicted relationships between top executive type, Holding and Symbiotic acquisitions 
is not forthcoming. Further enquiry revealed a close link between top executive type and 
strategic interdependence suggesting that this is the dominant dimension of the framework 
whereas the relationship with autonomy can only be described as weak and inconsistent. In 
Holding acquisitions, Insiders dominate and this may be explained by the need for rapid 
improvement in acquired firm performance. Insiders are best placed to deliver rapid and 
substantial change. However it is noticeable that whilst Outsiders are disadvantaged in these 
terms, they are associated with higher performance outcomes which may indicate a more 
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surgical approach to appropriate change. These results are contrary to the substantial findings 
in the related turnaround literature (9, 29, 30) and are worthy of further exploration. 
 
Symbiotic acquisitions shows a more dynamic quality to the deployment of Insiders and 
Outsiders as acquisitions in this context start with the former and later appoint the latter. The 
Insider seems critical in the early stages of integration to preserve the integrity of the acquired 
firm‟s capabilities, whereas later in the process, greater benefit can be gained through a 
gradual convergence with the acquiring firm through inter-organisational change. The 
existence of differential timings in the types of top executive deployment in Symbiotic 
acquisitions suggests a more dynamic quality in choice than is commonly recognised.  
 
Overall this paper has shown considerable variation amongst top executive retention across 
different post acquisition strategies. This is an important finding for research into top 
management turnover in M&A as current studies assume an unjustified homogeneity for 
acquisition integration. Furthermore a more fine grained approach to post acquisition 
integration reveals that there are important nuances in the relationship between top executive 
type and subsequent levels of organizational change depending upon the integration context.  
  
Practitioner Implications 
The data in this paper shows that different types of top executive are deployed to manage post 
acquisition strategies and this decision is driven more by intentions regarding strategic 
benefits rather than anticipation of organisational constraints. By privileging one over the 
other, acquirers should guard against potential over-estimation of the ability of retained 
management to instigate fundamental change. 
 
Within each post acquisition strategy the paper shows that even with different top executive 
types, they agree upon the main change themes appropriate for that integration. However the 
different skills and abilities of Insiders and Outsiders are more appropriate in some 
circumstances than others. In particular Insiders are best suited to maintaining the integrity 
and core competencies of the acquired firm and, despite being able to act rapidly in 
implementing internal change, are good at resisting fundamental alterations. Insiders should 
be used in Preservation acquisitions, the initial stages of Symbiotic acquisitions and 
potentially in Holding acquisitions. Outsiders on the other hand bring a more objective view 
and do not have the same vested interests. They are better able to span between the parent and 
acquired company and far more willing to make changes in the acquired company to further 
inter-organisational integration. This makes them ideal for Absorption and later stage 
Symbiotic integrations and potentially in Holding acquisitions.  
 
The consequences of misallocating Insiders and Outsiders are illustrated in the case data. 
Outsiders cause greater disruption and potential for damage in Preservation acquisitions and 
Insiders hinder and resist needed change in Absorption acquisitions. In Holding acquisitions it 
may appear that Outsiders do not move as fast or as extensively as Insiders, but their 
objectivity and willingness to kill sacred cows may make them a more effective executive in 
this situation. The key questions for acquirers in Holding situations are how time critical are 
changes, as Insiders may be able to act more rapidly and extensively. If time is less pressing 
then Outsiders may be a wiser choice. For Symbiotic acquisitions it would be an error to 
appoint an Outsider at the outset as this would risk damaging acquired firm core 
competencies. However, to let an Insider stay in charge for the long term, may prevent 
potential synergies from being achieved between the two firms. The dynamic quality of 
interfacing between Insiders and Outsiders in Symbiotic acquisitions is noteworthy and so 
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important questions for acquirers managing this type of acquisition are how long should an 
Insider remain in place before moving to an Outsider; what might the indication for top 
executive change be; should there be a period of co-existence to enable smooth handover? 
 
Identifying the appropriate top executive type for managing a particular post acquisition 
integration style is important not only for having the right person in place once a deal has 
been transacted, but also for the significant affect it will have upon the tenor and bargaining 
positions of earlier negotiations. Acquirers will need to consider how they wish to signal to 
top executives in acquisition targets. Wishing to retain an Insider will require significant time 
and investment to ensure continuity, through financial and social incentives, whilst building 
mutual understanding and trust for a strong working relationship post deal. Where the 
intention is to bring in an Outsider, attention will focus, not upon retention, but upon enabling 
the Insider to depart without destabilising the acquired firm and organising a smooth 
handover to the new top executive.  
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End notes 
Lists of variables used in this study and their groupings are available on request from the 
author 
 
1. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) do not discuss Holding acquisitions except to 
conceptualise that they could exist. 
2. Cohen‟s kappa coefficient of consistency was chosen because it allows for two coders, it 
accounts for chance agreement between coders compared to percent agreement and is among 
the most commonly accepted rates in management research (60). 
3. Strong form of Strategic interdependence 
4. I9 is a new Insider 
5. Result for Insider/Outsider against time elapsed in Symbiotic acquisitions is -.6299, n = 6, 
significance = .039. 
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Appendix 1  Anonymous details of interviewees 
 
 Acquisition 
type 
Deal size* Sector Top 
executive 
type 
Code 
1 Preservation  Small Precision engineering I I1 
2 “ Small Packaging manufacturing I I2 
3 “ Med. Transport I I3 
4 “ Med. Medical  O O1 
5 “ Large Communication O O2 
6 “ Large Communication I I4 
      
7 Absorption Small Composite manufacture I I5 
8 “ Small Professional services I I6 
9 “ Small Professional services O O3 
10 “ Med. Food manufacturing O O4 
11 “ Med. Utilities O O5 
12 “ V. large Communications O O6 
 
13 Holding Small Financial services I I7 
14 “ Small Engineering I I8 
15 “ Small Property services I I9 
16 “ Small Industrial service O O7 
17 “ Small Electronics I I10 
18 “ Large Industrial land usage I I11 
      
19 Symbiotic Large Food manufacture O O8 
20 “ Small Engineering O O9 
21 “ Small Engineering I I12 
*Deal size at completion: Small (£8m - £25m), Medium (£26m - £100m), Large (£101m - £500m), Very large 
(£501m - £4bn) 
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 Figures and tables 
 
 
Figure 1     Responding sample by Insiders/Outsiders  
 
New executives from different 
industries  
= 11 cases 
 
New executives from the same 
industry as the acquired business 
= 12 cases 
 
Organisational* 
Outsiders 
 23 cases 
 
 
Incumbents 
= 33 cases 
 
New executives drawn from 
within the acquired business = 10 
cases 
Organisational*  
Insiders 
 43 cases 
 
  Total     66 cases 
* Organisation refers to the target company acquired 
Note: acquiring companies came from the target‟s own industry and outside its industry in equal measure 
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Figure 2 Distribution of Insiders and Outsiders 
     Organisational Autonomy 
    Low      High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic 
Low Holding 
 
 
Insiders = 82.4% of cases 
 
 
 
 
 
Cases = 17 
Preservation 
 
 
Insiders = 75.0% of cases 
 
 
 
 
 
Cases = 32 
Inter-
dependence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
Absorption 
 
 
 
 
Outsiders = 72.7% of cases 
 
 
 
Cases = 11 
Symbiotic 
 
 
 
 
Outsiders = 66.6% of cases 
 
 
 
Cases = 6 
 
 
Number of cases = 66 
Source: Adapted from Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 
  Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square* 10.772 2 .005 
Likelihood Ratio 10.195 2 .006 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
7.896 1 .005 
N of Valid Cases 
60   
1 cell (16.7%) has expected count less than 5. This is acceptable (Everitt, 1977). 
 
* Symbiotic acquisition cases are excluded as the number of observations for those cells is too low for this 
statistical test. 
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 Table 1 Level of autonomy versus use of Insiders / Outsiders 
                Level of Autonomy 
 Low Medium High  
 
Outsider 
8 
7.0 
34.8% 
1.0 
7 
5.9 
30.4% 
1.1 
8 
10.1 
34.8% 
-2.1 
23 
34.8% 
 
Insider 
12 
13.0 
27.9% 
-1.0 
10 
11.1 
23.3% 
-1.1 
21 
18.9 
48.8% 
2.1 
43 
65.2% 
 20 
30.3% 
17 
25.8% 
29 
43.9% 
66 
100.0% 
Key to cells:  Count, Expected value, Row Percentage, Un-standardised Residual 
 
Chi-square Value DF Significance 
Pearson 1.20725 2 .54683 
 
Table 2 Mann-Whitney U test: Strategic Interdependence versus Insiders / 
Outsiders 
top executive Type Number of cases Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Outsiders 23 42.11 968.5 
Insiders 43 28.90 1243 
 66   
  
U W Z 2-Tailed P 
296.5 1242.5 -2.6877 .0072 
 
Table 3 Mann-Whitney U tests for strategic interdependence items against use of 
Insiders / Outsiders 
Transfer / Sharing 
items 
Mean rank of 
Outsiders 
Mean rank of Insiders 2-tailed P  
Personnel 40.67 29.66 .0198 
Physical Assets 38.37 30.90 .0757 
Knowledge and 
Information 
40.61 29.70 .0225 
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Table 4  Summary of results 
Hypothesis Findings 
1. Post acquisition organisational autonomy will be 
negatively associated with the appointment of 
Outsiders in the acquired company and positively 
associated with the retention of Insiders 
Not supported 
Mann-Whitney U test  
2-tailed P =  .1357  
2. Post-acquisition strategic interdependence will be 
positively associated with the use of Outsiders and 
negatively associated with the use of Insiders in the 
acquired company 
Supported 
Mann-Whitney U test  
2-tailed P = .007 level 
Confirmation of the alignment of top executive type 
with the axes hypothesized above is confirmed with 
Insiders in  Preservation and Outsiders in 
Absorption acquisitions 
Preservation cases 
75.0% of top executives were Insiders.  
Pearson chi-squared for matrix = .005 
Absorption cases 
72.7% of top executives were Outsiders 
Pearson chi-squared for matrix = .005 
3. Outsiders will predominate in Holding 
acquisitions 
Not supported 
82.4% of top executives were Insiders 
Pearson chi-squared for matrix = .005 
4. Insiders will predominate initially in Symbiotic 
acquisitions and then Outsiders will predominate 
Supported 
Kendall Tau  correlation = -.6299 
P = .039 
5.   
Insiders will express more positive views than 
Outsiders on the success of the acquisition, in terms 
of achieving its strategic objectives, 
in Preservation acquisitions. 
 
Outsiders will express more positive views than 
Insiders on the success of the acquisition, in terms 
of achieving its strategic objectives: 
In Absorption acquisitions, 
In Holding acquisitions, 
In Symbiotic acquisitions. 
 
 
 
 
Supported, t = 1.73, P = .05 
 
 
 
 
Supported, t = 3.26, P = .01 
Supported, t = 2.77, P = .01 
Supported, t = 2.33, P = .03 
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